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uring the Eighth Annual Spring Public Lecture Series
hosted by the Committee on Social Theory at the University of Kentucky, David Harvey talked on "Justice
and the Geographies of Difference." In his lecture,
Professor Harvey continued his interrogation of issues
of social justice as viewed through the lens of his historical-geographical materialism. Although most
widely known to an interdisciplinary audience for his
book, The Condition of Postmodernity (19 89), David
Harvey has written extensively over the past quartercentury on Marxism, urbanism, and social justice - a
project already underway when his Social justice and
the City (1973) radically redefined geographic approaches to the urban scene in the early 1970s.
The major aim of this interview is to illuminate
connections and (dis)continuities in David Harvey's
body of work at a time when his just-published book,
justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, 1 explores the discursive construction of 'the' environment
and the manner in which conceptions of nature bear
theoretically on broader issues of social justice. The
first part of the interview deals with discourses surrounding the definition of the environment as an object of political struggle and academic inquiry and
touches on how notions of the individual are mobilized, consciously or unconsciously, in those dis- "'
:s
courses. In the second part, Professor Harvey discusses 9"
the strengths and weaknesses of Marxian notions of ~
productivism and their bearing on environmental politics. The interview concludes with a provocative dis- .2
cussion of institutionalized identities in academia.
While Professor Harvey suggests that institutes of Afri- CU
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can-American Studies, Environmental Studies, Queer Studies, and
Women's Studies among others, are politically useful in their ability to
provide institutional support for underrepresented viewpoints within
the academy, he argues that these institutionalized identities often foster an unwillingness to engage in broad-based political struggles.

. J'f'urse, anf he
'i.;

11

dC: Can we start with what may be an obvious question? Why this
book now; why the environment now? What purchase might it give
you?
DH: Well, actually, it is part of a rather continuous project that seems
to have me, as a geographer, in perpetual dialogue with Marxism and,
as a Marxist, having a perpetual dialogue with geography. The book is
not only solely about the environment, it is also about themes of place
and space and time and dialectics and materiality and history and geography. In many ways I want to view it as an exercise in how to theoretically construct what I would call an historical-geographical materialism. You can't do that without taking account of environmental
history and the environmental aspect of things.
I've always felt that the traditional Marxist emphasis on the point of
production missed a lot of things about urbanization, so a lot of my
work has been on social and political issues involved in urbanization.
I've written a lot on the built environment and it seemed to me that
the idea that there is something over there called the 'built environment' and something over here called 'the environment' was a totally
false dichotomy. Therefore, this was a very appropriate moment to
say: well, you can't really separate those two questions. If you can't
separate them then you also have to go out and look at what many
people are saying about the environment - how it is being talked
about and the sorts of politics that come out of different ways of talking about it. So, for me anyway, this has been part of a long project of
the last twenty, thirty years. It's not as if I've suddenly discovered the
environment. In a sense, there are bits of it there all along.
dC: Could you say that your focus now, on particular environmental
movements and different discourses of the environment, is a new perspective you are trying to take?

ADH: Yes, well, I think that it seemed important to engage with what

f ~ple are saying about the environment and to engage with it criti~'
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cally in terms of the kind of perspective I was trying to build (the historical-geographical materialism) and to ask questions about whether
these are fruitful ways of talking about the environment or whether
they are what I would regard as negative and self-destructive ways of
talking about environmental issues. So, I wanted to look more closely
at varieties of environmental discourse and, as so often happens, I get
led by my graduate students. I had a graduate student who was working with me in Oxford on environmental discourses and I got very interested in what he was doing on the different ways in which acid rain
was talked about by scientists, politicians, the public, and environmental groups. You could see these different discourses being set up
and used as part of a play of power (Hajer 1995).
dC: There seems also to be an epistemological shift, I think, in addition to a turning of attention to questions of environment for reasons
you mentioned. At least in my mind, there seems to be a fairly strong
contrast between the rigorous, almost mathematical precision of
books like Limits to Capital (1982) and the kinds of inquiries you are
undertaking now, which are much more concerned with discourses. I
don't believe 'discourse' is a term that would have come up in the context of Limits.
DH: Well, Limits was a very specific exercise of burying myself in the
Marxist discourse and then trying to understand from the inside how
to approach some of these broader questions of urbanization, space,
and time. If I re-wrote it - and actually I'm thinking of rewriting
Limits - I think the whole question of the relation to nature would
be much more strongly present. But I .t hink that the main themes I'm
now looking at are still, as it were, defined in Limits in terms o~ ~u
man relations to nature, space, time, in relationship to pohncal
economy and the kind of politics that can be developed around it. So,
my main theme is the same but now I'm doing something different,
in the sense of saying that, well okay I have my discourse b~t I .recognize that there are all these other discourses; much as I did in The
Condition ofPostmodemity.
In The Condition of Postmodemity I had to look at what all ki~ds of
other people are saying and then try to set up an understanding of
why people are saying the things they are sayin~. think th~t that also
follows through into the discussion of the varienes of envuo.nmen~al
discourse because that's a very complex issue and these various discourses have to be addressed if you are going to get anywhere in terms
of having a dialogue with them. I don't think that there is any en~i
ronmental discourse that doesn't have some moment of uuth to it.
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Therefore, the whole question of dialogue is trying to find another
way to talk about it that doesn't concede everything that they would
want us to concede but, nevertheless, registers what I think are some
important points. So, yes, I do engage with discourse - different discursive groups - now in ways that I didn,t in Limits to Capital But, if
you go back, you'll find that a book like Social Justice and the City is,
in fact, an internal dialogue between two discursive forms, so in a
sense this isn't entirely foreign territory to me.
dC: I wonder about the comparison between the analysis in The Condition and your treatment of questions of discourse in that book and
the kinds of things I see in "The Environment of Justice" piece
(Harvey forthcoming), and the piece on militant particularism
(Harvey 1995). Again, to press the point a little, it seems as though
there is a bit of an epistemological shift in the sense that in The Condition - at the risk of over-simplifying - part of the exercise is to suggest that a lot of contemporary discussions about discourse and power
are, in fact, properly thought of as part of capitalist modernity. Contrast that with the discussion of power and discourse in "The Environment of Justice" which seems much more free-floating and much
more prepared to accept that different discourses about the environment create a material reality all their own. So, the question of the
connection to material processes and processes of production and
consumption is still important but, perhaps, secondary.
DH: I don't think I would quite accept that as my meaning. It's
maybe what people get out of it, and that's one of the things I never
can tell. I think my meaning is to say that - if I go back to Marx's
phrase - the world of discourse, if you want to call it that, is where
we become conscious of questions and fight them out. I think that's
correct. That doesn't mean the world of discourse is secondary to
questions of production. I mean some people would use a simple base
and superstructure argument and say: "Well, it's all epiphenomena in
the discursive realm.,, But I wouldn't want to put it the other way
round either and say that discursive activities construct the world and
therefore the discourses are primary in relation to practices. I just
don't think that it's reasonable - if you take a dialectical view - to
say that one dominates the other. They both internalize the effects of
the other. Practices, for instance, incorporate technological understandings which would be achieved through science and through the
formation of certain kinds of discourses. So production internalizes
~ch of what we have learned through discursive analyses and, at the
~,
.
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,,r~e~ time o course, 1scourses are not immune to being transformed
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and translated by material practices.
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dC: I would like to point to another tension, not so much between
materialism and discourse per se, but in terms of praxis on the left.
Roger Gottlieb (1995) has argued that radical political movements in
the west presuppose, or have presupposed, an individualistic, consumerist ego despite their collective rhetoric.
DH: Well, I think, part of what rm working on right now, or have
been working on and that came up very strongly in the book is precisely this question about how do we understand an individual and in
what ways can we create a theory of the individual which is different
from that which exists in, say, the Lockian, Newtonian, Cartesian tradition of an isolated entity endowed with certain powers that confronts the world and does certain things to it. This is a very different
conception to the premodern view and a very different conception to
the deep ecological view, and very different from what I would call a
relational view of an individual where the individual is really construed not so much as a box but as a point which is defined by vectors
of processes which are more free-flowing.
That relational conception of the individual is embedded in some of
deep ecology - you'll find it in Naess2 for example - but you'll also
find it in a lot of the ethnographic materials and you'll find it in the
Mediaeval conception of the individual which was very much more
porous and open in relation to the world. I think that the rethinking
of who is the individual and how an individual exists in the midst of
socio-ecological processes strikes me as one of the more important
gestures to make, which is why I recently got interested in how we
understand the body. So, I think that it is true that most of the radical
political movements - and this would also include communist
movements - have carried over certain of the baggage of eighteenth
century liberal thought on the individual. These movements have also
carried over a lot of that thinking into very productivist, instrumental
notions in terms of dealing with nature. The left has actually inherited \I
from the capitalist era some very fundamental concepts and hasn't ac:s
tually revolutionized them. I think one of the good things that is com- 91\
Cft
ing out of environmentalism and deep ecology is the challenge to c
reconceprualize these concepts. I think I would accept that challenge. c
0
I mean, I think it is important to admit that the whole history of socialism and communism from the nineteenth century onwards has
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not had a good record in its dealings with nature. I think that it's unfortunate if we on the left in that tradition merely go back to the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and Engels and then trot out
Raymond Williams and William Morris to say, "Oh well, we were interested in this all along." I think we have to recognize that much of
the history of communism has gone in a different direction. And that
involves me, as a geographer, with historical interests in questions of
environment and nature and urbanization, in some sort of critical
stance in relationship to that whole Marxist, leftist history.
dC: So, an engagement with the environment and the individual's
relationship to it from a Marxist perspective, would open up the categories of the individual or the identity of individuals and maybe
move us away from more crude socialist ideas of the individual as primarily a worker or a capitalist. I realize that's a very crude characterization but does it open it up so someone can be a worker, also a consumer, also ... ?
DH: One of the things I have tried to do is to redefine what I think
the class relation is. The interesting thing about Marx was that he had
no theory of class. Where did he write out his theory of class? There
are three pages right at the end ofVolume 3 of Capital where he wrote
something about class. If you look in detail at how he treats class, my
conclusion is that the proper definition of class is positionality in relationship to the circulation and accumulation of capital. Now, that
means that the worker as a person has a very complex positionality in
relationship to that circulation process. They exist in a relationship to
it as consumer; they exist in relationship to it as somebody who has
rights of exchange - rights of exchange of their own labor power,
rights of exchange of whatever money they hold. They also exist in a
certain relationship to capital and the labor process and so on, so that
the class relation is really positionality in relation to accumulation. As
a worker they may have pension rights and as a pension-holder they
have, actually, an interest in sustained accumulation. In fact, you
might turn to a worker and say. "I am going to fire you and just think
what benefit you are going to get when the stock market goes up after
I fire you! Your pension will be worth much more." So this is the
point about positionality in relationship to circulation.
Again, environmental questions open up all sorts of interesting questions of positionality. When Gottlieb says there is a whole history of
/'oocupational safety and health discussions which are a part of what
{.~~nistory of labor has been about, I think that that's right. The envi~~
onmental issue in the workplace is just as important as the environ-
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mental issue in the living place. Those kind of questions, then, start to
change the definition of what an environmental issue is. I think the
same thing would arise in terms of quality oflife in urban areas. If you
wander around Baltimore and start talking to people about what they
think the key environmental issues are, you get a completely different
story than when you wander around in the exurbs or in upstate Vermont. Lead poisoning in Baltimore has a variety of different forms,
one of which is bullets and, you know, at that point you say, "Well as
far as the people in those situations are concerned, the differentiation
between natural and social environments disappears." It's a very interesting thing. Where in this room does the natural environment begin
and the social environment stop? Where in a field of wheat does nature begin and sociality stop? We have these extraordinary conventions that there is something called 'nature' and something called 'society.' There are two boxes, can we put those two boxes together?
dC: So it seems then that you see the different discourses raking place
at the moment about the environment and how we define the environment as issues that give us a lot of political purchase in contemporary society under capitalism. Do you think that that purchase has increased in recent years?
DH: I think that depends where you are. I mean, I think that in some
parts of the world, it has definitely become a major political issue and
that some of it is rather conservative, middle class, quality-of-life
kinds of questions, some of it is a rather romanticized reaction to the
high-tech industrialized world. There are all sorts of strains which you
can find. So, I think environmental discourses have a variety of origins and then have a variety of political meanings, and I suppose the
interesting thing is how to find common threads or find what are not
common threads between those different discourses. Why is it, for example, that the environmental justice movement by-and-large doesn't
like the Big Ten environmental groups? Why are they constantly at
loggerheads with those people? What's going on there?
There's a funny thing here. What's nature? What if I give you a chemical formula and say, how do you feel about your relationship to that?
If you are a chemist you might say that there are all sorts of interesting
things that can be done with it. If I then take that chemical formula :s
and represent it to you as a tree, then you relate to it in a different ~
way. Now, what's nature? Is it all the molecules that make up the tree, c
c
or is it the tree? The point is that if you see a tree, you'll react to it dif- 0
ferently than you would if you saw a bunch of molecules, and if you
see a tree in a habitat in a forest with a spotted owl sitting in it you
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would react very differently than if you just saw a tree. So, the question is, what is nature and I think my point is that nature is all of
those. I think there is no one, single representation of nature which
can really capture the ways in which we might relate to it.
dC: Certain ways of looking at it are given more power in certain
cases. The idea of scientific discourse versus some more localist, environmentalist idea of what is best for nature.
DH: Yes, but in our practice, you see, we actually use all of those discourses. When we use paper, we are actually relating to a whole history of technology which is about understanding the tree as a bunch
of molecules which can be transformed in different ways into a different form. So, at the same time, we see a tree. It's not as if one bunch of
people looks at it one way and another looks at it another way. We internalize a variety of ways oflooking at it and as we switch our terrain,
we change the sorts of things we think we might want to do with it. If
I look at a bunch of molecules, I say, "Well, why don't we transform
them and make them do this,,, and if I look at the tree I say, "Don't
cut it down.,, I think the point is to ask, which way of looking should
be dominant?
dC: And that's the politics.
DH: And that gets you into the politics. What are you trying to do?
And why would you choose one level of looking at things rather than
the other? Why did I choose the tree instead of global warming or
why would I choose the molecular structure? To me, the richness of
part of the environmental debate is precisely that it captures a relation
to nature understood at different scales, understood in terms of different positionalities.
dC: I think this returns us to the question about identity and individuality. It often seems to me that in these so-called debates, say between the pro-spotted owl and the pro-logging forces in the Pacific
Northwest, that one of the basic problems is that people are operating
within the same paradigm of identity, property, space, and time. So,
one of the ironies is that it appears we re speaking very much the same
language. One looks from the outside and suggests that you can't resolve these conflicts unless you transcend that language and think
about identity in a different way. A sense of identity that would not be
zero-sum would say, "Your gain is not necessarily my loss; your sense
of_Eroperty is not necessarily my sense of exclusion.,,
1

#"°'

( 'fJ!., ¥1: No, I think that's right. I think part of the problem right now in

t. ~ whole area is to find a politics that transcends that zero-sum men~~;/

tality and actually starts to work through a different way of framing
what the issue is.
dC: This would be part of what you call "transformative politics,,?
DH: Yes. It's transformative, but transformative politics are also transgressive and you find yourself transgressing sometimes the Marxist
tradition, sometimes the bourgeois tradition, and obviously some of
the deeply-held belief structures of the environmental groups. Take
the discourse of the chemist who thinks about molecules and the discourse of the person who talks about habitats and trees. Those are different discourses that can be reasonably combined to look at a particular kind of question. You don t say it's either one or the other, you
don't say that you should never think like the chemist. One of the
problems I have with some of the environmental justice rhetoric is
that it sometimes seems like you should never think like a chemist,
you should never produce a toxin. I don t know if you remember the
principles of environmental justice,3 but one of them says you
shouldn't produce any toxins. Think how many people in the world
will die if we stop producing toxins! This is a very odd principle and,
in a sense, it is part of the rhetoric of the environmental justice movement, particularly in its more spiritual forms. It says you cannot ever
think like a chemist and if you think like a chemist it's betraying
Mother Earth. I would not accept that; you have to be prepared to
think like the chemist a lot of the time, but you also have to be prepared to think about trees and habitats and the like.
1

1

But again, it comes back to this notion of the transformative ways in
which we think biologically and socially and historically. So, rd want
to concentrate on that sort of transformative idea and then ask questions about transformation into what, for whom, with what consequences for whom? At that point you look at the history of what s
gone on and you say that, basically, much of transformation has go~e
on for capital accumulation, for the rich, the privileged, the bourgeoisie, and not for those who have been marginalized. So, indeed at that
level, the environmental movement is picking up on something whic~
is very powerful and very strong and very correct. It's saying the environmental transformations that have occurred in our society are for
the benefit of some and have not benefited others. And, in fact, envi- :I
ronmental degradation has been connected to the whole question of en
disempowered, underprivileged and frequently racially-marked pop~ c
c
lations. And, in that sense, the environmental justice movement is 0
dead right in pointing to that as a critical issue. The demand.for a different form of transformative politics that is not about capital accu1
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mulation and is not about reinforcing that power structure is a dead
right argument, from my perspective.
dC: Could social ecologists, in terms of building bridges and building
a basis for more widespread policies, perhaps be more receptive to
broadly defined spiritual views that stress social compassion and transcendence of desire (by desire, I mean desire for consumption)? It
seems to me thaes another particular tension between the deep ecological view and the social ecological view.
DH: I think that whole argument can also be grounded in a completely different way. For instance, if you go back to Manes argument
that real, sensual interaction with nature is both the grounding of personal and political consciousness and that through real sensual interaction with the world we learn who we are and what we are and how
we are and learn all kinds of things about ourselves. I would rather
talk about it in terms of sensuality rather than talking about what
seems to me to be the somewhat mystical concept of spirituality. This
is difficult terrain, I mean I understand what some people are saying
when they are talking about spirituality. My difficulty with it is that it
often means that you actually come back to a Cartesian split; that
consciousness and materiality are separate from each other. Naess, for
example grounds a lot of his work in Spinoza but I think actually with
a hidden Cartesianism even though they are overtly critical of
Descartes. If you trot out Descartes in front of many of those folks,
they go up the wall, but actually, if you look, a lot of what theire talking about in terms of spirituality often has this Cartesian element in
lt.

~ote: The remainder ofthe interview was carried out the following

morning.

social project, it is fundamentally problematic.
DH: It seems to me, you have multiple foundational arguments being
used in the environmental question and if you're saying, do I think
that Marxism can embrace all of them; no, I think the answer is not.
There s obviously going to be a struggle over what kind of attitude we
take to the environment. My attitude is certainly not that of deep
ecology or eco-feminism although I think both are saying something
thaes interesting. So, for me the problem is to create a very distinctive
approach to environmental questions that is embedded in Marxian
epistemology.
1

Now, for some other people in the environmental movement, that
might be problematic, but I want to see how far I can get with it. I
think that one of the things thaes happened within Marxism as it has
approached the environmental issue is that it has conceded too much
in terms of trying to shape a different epistemological basis. I think
Marxists are doing too linle to look at the question of how far we can
go within the Marxian frame itself to talk about many of these environmental, ecological questions.
My grounding in a lot of this comes out of a very lengthy and deep
engagement with Manes own work. That is always the basis on which
I start. Within that framework, I find that there is a great deal in
terms of phenomenological approaches to nature, particularly in the
early work of Marx. There is a great deal in terms of historical materialism, which I have tried to broaden to historical-geographical materialism, that has a lot to say about environmental issues. I think that
environmental policies is not really very well integrated into the
Marxian tradition but I don t see any real big barriers to better integration. Not to everybody s satisfaction, but then eco-feminists are
not saying things that satisfy deep ecologists or Earth First!ers. So, we
know we are not going to satisfy everybody, but there is something
that can be done.
1

1

dC: So you don t think that the inherent produccivism of classical
Marxist tradition is necessarily a barrier to thinking ecologically?
1

dC: It occurred to me that a number of people might argue that your
attempt to weld an environment.alist politics to a Marxist analysis is
problematic because Marxist analysis, itself is part of the problem,
epistemologically. I was trying to think about a critique that would
suggest that part of the problem is the way in which we philosophize
about nature as an object, about categories of race and about catego~ _of gender as objects. I think that some people would suggest that
~~arxi~t envir~nm~~talism m~ght b.e an appropriate tactical position
{ , ~. ~e m certam militant paruculansms, but as a general ecologicalW;<
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DH: No. In fact I think ies fundamental because you can t deny the
issue of production and I think that Marx s focus on the labor process :I
as being that point of fundamental interaction between us and the
~
metabolic world around us is a fundamental starting point for any c
analysis. I don t find any theory of production in, for instance, deep c
0
ecology; in fact, they evade it. Now, the theory of production is fundamental. So, if you say there is a whole history of productivism
1
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within the Marxist movement, I'd agree with you and say, yes that's
problematic. We have to start with the analysis of production, and I
think Marx's starting point is the correct one. What kind of production, how production is organized, what sort of relation to nature
evolves out of different production processes is a question to be
looked at in terms again of socialist objectives which are not about the
health of some abstract concept called 'nature,, they are very much
about the exploration of human potentialities and possibilities.
dC: So you would define as productivism that way of thinking that
sees production as always production for, it's always the production of
objects for human needs, it's always a productivist approach and an
objectifying approach to the natural world?
DH: Yes, but it's a little bit more than that. As productivism developed in some aspects of the Marxist tradition, it basically said that we
can use the world around us in any way we want and there are no barriers. So one can criticize that, but for me the philosophical basis for
this is to say that production is a process and that it's a transformative
process and we're constantly transforming the world around us, we
can't stop doing that. Even by the act of breathing and eating we are
transformative ecological agents. So, Marx's analysis of production as
a process is talking about that process of transforming the world
around us in ways that we can use. Now, in the process, we do indeed
produce objects and those objects have character and qualities which
are, in some instances, fairly stable ecological features. But then I
don't see any other theory of ecology that can say we do not create
objects for others or ourselves. I mean, what kind of ecological world
would it be if we didn't do that? I think a lot of the evasion that goes
on inside some areas of the ecological movement about the question
of production and transformative activities of human beings is not
helpful.
dC: I don't think, though, that that's what feminists are concerned
about when they say the production paradigm concentrates on the
production of goods within economic circuits and that these always
seem to be defined in terms of 'male' activities of production and that
'female' productive activities in the domestic sphere, for example,
tend to get ignored, elided, or submerged. I know one of the basic
feminist concerns with Marxist thinking is the way in which it has a
built-in gender-privileging in terms of production.

/ D!f.: Well historically that may be the case but there is nothing philo/ ~phically in Marxism that says that it is the case. If action is a trans-
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formative process then all forms of transformative activity are part of
that production process. I don't think that it is fundamental to the
Marxian approach that there should be some activities that don't
count and others that do. That separation between what goes on in
the household and what goes on in the formal workplace is indeed
something that the Marxist tradition has worked with in terms of its
definition of class and class relations. It has been important and I
don't deny that. But what I'm driving back to is to say yes, there may
be some problems with such thought and that production should be
looked at as all forms of transformative activities which occur,
whether they occur in the domestic sphere or in a more public arena
like the workplace. So, there are these historical schisms, if you like,
and I think that the feminist critique of Marxist productivism is perfectly correct on all of that. But it doesn't seem to me that that undermines the philosophical basis of looking at production as a process as
being the fundamental starting point for understanding any ecological issue.

dC: Well, it seems that brings us to the question of identity and politics that you've discussed recently (Harvey 1993). Coul~. you t~k
about how you see the possibilities for a generalized pohucs which
recognizes different identities - the worker, or someone who produces, as being a certain identity or a politics based on being a woman
or being gay or being a certain ethnic minority, for instance - but allows a movement to come out of it? Or, have things just become too
fragmented?
DH: I think there are some issues where the fragmentations are there
and there is no point in saying they can all be submerged, but there
are many very pressing issues where, it seems to me, the fragmentations really don't matter so much in relationship to politics. It c~mes
back to the statement by Donna Haraway which says some differences are significant and others are relatively trivial and the key question for a lot of us is to figure out what are significant differences ~d
what are not. 4 For example cleaners and janitors have launched a livable wage campaign against Johns Hopkins University in ~altimore.
That is indeed a fundamentally class issue but the campaigners are c
mostly women and African-Americans. They want a livable wage, 0
which doesn't mean there aren't problems of sexual harassment on the
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job, that there aren't problems of racial discrimination which are also
important in their lives. But if you said that those questions are more
significant than the livable wage question, I think they would look at
you and say, "You,re off your rocker!" Primarily, they're interested in a
livable wage and that's the class aspect of their lives, which is fundamental to how they're living and what's happening to them. I don't
think they would see this as a separate issue in the way that so many
people in the academy would. The livable wage means all kinds of
things to them in all kinds of ways and that does include their status
as women and it does include their status as African-Americans.
What annoys me a little bit is that when you hit these situations you
so frequently find that those people who are heavily invested in identity politics won't enter into them in a supportive way because they
are not the kind of issues they like to take on. A lot of academic discussion has moved off into a kind of identity politics which is about
struggles for power inside the academy and I think some of that is understandable and justifiable because the only way you can get power
in the academy is, in effect, to launch some kind of identity-based
campaign and to say that this is a special issue that has to be taken
care 0£ But if we are not going to pay attention to the cleaners' and
janitors' campaign, then it seems to me that we've got a problem with
the way in which identity politics is working inside of universities.
I'm going to speak personally; I often find myself in support of a lot of
those identity recognitions inside universities because I think it is very
important that those things happen, but then I get very annoyed
when that support doesn't come back in terms of supporting projects
like the one in Baltimore. That is the dilemma I have with some identity politics in the academy. It's a positive process but it produces a
thing i.e., a Women's Studies center, a Queer Studies center, or a Black
Studies center, and the thing then becomes an internalized ghetto almost and there is a refusal to come out of that thing and engage with
broader politics. I think those are the sorts of things that I find a bit
hard to take. When almost anything gets institutionalized it becomes
very much about the perpetuation of its own existence. I guess one of
the things I'm glad of is that I don't have a Center of Marxist Studies.
I'm glad I don't have that because I would be worried that I'd lose my
center when I engaged with certain issues.
dC: So you have a problem with the institutionalization of identities?
/ DJ}: No, I can see that there is a certain logic to it that is probably
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~cessary at a certain stage. In order to build and bolster certain
"'°"'ilnderrepresented groups or currents of thought inside of the acad-

"

} I

· -A!'"•r
. r

/.,-.

139ID. Harvey interview
emy, you probably need to go through a stage of setting up a center to
highlight it, but at some time or another the point would be to dissolve it. For instance, I don't think that women's studies, in the long
run, should be Women's Studies, I think it should be everywhere and
understood to be everywhere.
We do have lots of centers of class studies in academia - they're all in
business schools. If you think of the resources that go into setting up
business schools and what they're all about, you say, "If the same resources were setting up labor schools ... ,,, but hardly any universities
have anything of that sort. Again, you can say that one of the weaknesses of Marxist class analysis within academia is that there are very
few centers where it has been institutionalized in order to protect itself. There are a few, but very few. It comes back to financial power,
and where is the financial power to support these kinds of issues? Financial power lies with corporate capital and the state apparatus.
There are very few places where you'd have the financial power to engage in the kind of pro-labor studies which parallel pro-business studies that come out of economics departments and business schools.
dC: If I could paraphrase; it sounds to me that what we are saying is
that identity is absolutely necessary and unavoidable, but that it becomes very problematic if one cries to raise it to the level of an ecological-social project. I've noticed that often in your writings, you
don't talk about identity, you talk about difference and particularly
significant difference and the conditions under which certain. differences come to make a difference. So, it seems that you are saymg, on
the one hand, that in certain local particularisms, particular kinds of
identity politics are going to be important but that, at the level of
projects, we should be thinking about the constitution of differences.
DH: Certain political situations can arise when one element of identity becomes more significant than others. For the cleaning people in
Baltimore, the ecological-environmental issue is not significant in the
same way it is for somebody who has a comfortable life living out in
the suburbs, which is not to say that the environmental issue is not
important but that the environment is defined in a different way. For
people who live in the inner-city of Baltimore, environi:ient is .understood as a set of questions and problems which are radically different
from those which you,d experience somewhere else. So, I would have a
much more relational view of identity. The self, the individual, the
subject internalizes all sorts of effects from the activiti~ they e~gaged
in, and uses that information to engage in certain projects which are
more significant than others. I don't think that most people in iden-
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city politics would even make the claim these days that identity is singular.
dC: What they are willing to do is engage in strategic essentialism,
where a cenain identity is considered to be the one that is most imponant in a given situation. When you talk about the cleaners' campaign in Baltimore and how you don't get the support you'd like from
the Women's Studies department, it seems that maybe the reason for
that is that they are engaging in a strategic essentialism which gives
them political power by focusing on the identity of 'woman' rather
than of 'class., Is it possible to bridge the gap between one strategic
essentialism and another? How can one identity help in another
identity's struggle?

DH: I think most people would accept that, in terms of strategic
essentialisms. There are strategic essentialisms built around the notion
of class and some around race and some around gender, and you can
multiply that in terms of sexual preference and the like. But, if the
strategic essentialism becomes exclusionary and says, "I'm not going
to be bothered about that question because thaes just about women,
or that's just about race and I'm only interested in questions of class.,,
If it becomes exclusionary in that way, then it becomes self-defeating.
What has to be engaged in is a process of persuasion to say when a difference is significant and why it's significant.
Why should a Women's Studies program or some institute for the
study of global power take a position on the situation of the cleaners
in Baltimore? The task is up to those who think they should do it to
get into some sort of persuasive mode and say, "This is a situation
where there is such a strong, overwhelming gender component that
not to engage in it is, in fact, to be self-defeating, even though it is
fundamentally a class issue." As you make those arguments, my experience is that people are certainly willing to listen. Part of doing politics is power: persuading people that this is a significant issue and it's
an issue which, even given your strategic essentialism, should be part
and parcel of what you are doing. Through that argument, people can
be brought into certain configurations of support. By the same token,
I would expect that people from these other areas would approach me
and say, "Listen, we need support. What kind of support are you willing to give?" On that basis, even though I'm not working primarily in
Queer Studies or something of that kind, it seems to be totally reason,.;ihle that I would try to support something along those lines even
/ ~ugh it is not my central theoretical interest.
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least in the labor movement, particularly since the election of John
Sweeney. 5 In this sense, the academy has fallen behind in various levels of support. Would you think that progressive coalitions in the 'real
world' would have an impact on the study of identity in academia and
that it might begin to break down these strategic essentialisms in
terms of coalition building?

DH: I hope so. I'm not very good at predicting these things, but
academia has not been a very innovative place if you look at it as a
place where social movements arise. It's been a place where social
movements start to get institutionalized inside the educational apparatus. If you look at, for instance, the environmental issue: was it academics who set this whole ball rolling? No, it wasn't really; it was
something that was actually outside of the academy, with some dissident scientists inside of the academy. It's been drawn into the academy and taken over inside the academy in all kinds of ways. You've
got all these Centers for Environmental Studies now, but I don't think
the innovative impulse came from inside. So, I think impulses from
outside are incredibly important, and trying to break down the walls
is actually a very enlivening experience.
When the organizers of this campaign around the cleaners came to us
and said, "We want to come on campus, we want to talk to you," they
clearly said they wanted an ongoing relationship with us and they
hoped that the people they were talking to would remain in conversation, no matter what happened on this issue. I found that to be a very
positive thing and I was very grateful to them that they didn't just say,
"Well, you better do something about your university; why don't you
go and do it?." They said, "Listen, this is part of an ongoing process,"
and through that they have pointed out to students that they can
spend the summer being trained as labor organizers and there are all
these possibilities for undergraduates or graduates to build some sort
of relationship with the labor movement. Some people may actually
become involved. I think that is all healthy. Now, whether that is going to lead to a long term thing or not, I don't know. Some of us
would hope it would and some of us would try to keep the connection alive, but I think some sort of resurgence in the labor movement
- building outwards and doing coalitions of this kind- seems to be
a very positive thing not only for politics in the city but also for politics inside the university. I am a bit hopeful along those lines. It does
seem to me rather crucial for us inside the academy to understand
that a lot of the really crucial issues are defined outside. What we are
very good at is taking up those issues and institutionalizing them and
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sening them up in a certain way and sometimes co-opting them too. I
think Environmental Studies programs have taken up the environmental issue and turned it into something that is about environmental management, which is something radically different from what
much of the environmental movement, as it was originally defined,
had in mind.

Notes
1. Harvey, David. 1996. Jusrice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference.
Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. This interview was conducted some months
before the publication of the book.
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. 1995. Militant Particularism and Global Ambition: The
--Conceptual Politics of Place, Space, and Environment in the
Work of Raymond Williams. Social Text 42:69-98.
. 1993. Class Relations, Social Justice and the Politics of
--Difference. In Place and the Politi.cs ofIdentity, ed. Michael Keith
and Steve Pile, pp.41-66. New York: Routledge.
_ _ . 1989. The Conditi.on ofPostmodernity. Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell.
_ _ . 1982. The Limits to Capital Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
_ _ . 1973. SocialJustice and the City. London: Arnold.

2. For example, see Naess, A. 1989. Ecology, Community, Lifestyle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. See Grossman, K 1994. The People of Color Environmental Summit, in
Robert Bullard ed. Unequal Protecrion: Environmental ]usrice and Communiries ofColor. San Francisco: Sierra Club.
4. "Some differences are playful, some are poles of world historical systems
of domination. Epistemology is about knowing the difference" (Haraway,
Donna. 1990. A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist
Feminism in the 1980s. In Linda Nicholson ed. Feminism/Postmodernism.
London: Routledge.)
5. John Sweeney was recently chosen president of the AFL-CIO in the first
contested election since their merger in 1955. Mr. Sweeney oversaw the remarkable growth of the Service Employees Internacional Union (SEIU) before being elected co chis position.
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